Attested Noise Protocol for Low-TCB Trusted Execution Environments


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Agenda

- 1. Project Oak
- 2. Noise Protocol
- 3. Remote Attestation



Project Oak



Research project aiming to make it possible for users to reason about <u>how their data</u> <u>will be used</u> by the server in ways verifiable by external reviewers

github.com/project-oak/oak

Google

Oak Building Blocks

Trusted Execution Environments

- Minimize the Trusted Computing Base (TCB)
- Use restricted environments and sandboxing


Remote Attestation

• Provide complete view of the workload

Transparency

- Open-source code
- Reproducible builds
- Verifiable Logs

Restricted Environment



Firmware

• vBIOS + Bootloader


Restricted Kernel

- Minimal syscall interface
- Single process, single-threaded
- No unattested executable pages

Features

- Minimal TCB
- Written in Rust
- Attestation stays valid after boot

Device Identifier Composition Engine (DICE)



Google

Goal

Use a Minimalistic Crypto Protocol

- Bind encrypted channel with remote attestation
- Don't need PKI
- Don't need certificates
- Minimize the amount of parsers
- Rust-only implementation

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


www.noiseprotocol.org

- Framework for building simple crypto protocols
- Directly based on Diffie-Hellman key agreement
 - No certificates/certificate authorities
- Doesn't restrict the wire format
 - Protocol provides bytes
- Authentication is optional

Noise Protocol: patterns

- Noise patterns are based on the keys used in the handshake
 - Ephemeral keys
 - Static keys, e.g., long term identity key
 - Pre-shared with the other party
 - Exchanged during the handshake
- Formal proofs for confidentiality and authentication security guarantees
- Handshake pattern analysis tool: <u>noiseexplorer.com</u>




Notation

- s static key
- e ephemeral key
- es, ee, ... Diffie-Hellman

Key agreement

- Rules for updating the local state
- Used to produce 2 symmetric keys (encryption/decryption)




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
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Noise Attestation


- Bind attestation to the Noise handshake
 - Allows making it a <u>separate</u> step
- Use Noise without modifications
 - Retains security formal proofs
- Supports bidirectional attestation
- Supports multiple attestations

Noise Attestation




- Responder provides attestation evidence
- Evidence contains a binding key
- Binding is done by signing the handshake transcript **h**
 - Includes a usage string

Bidirectional Noise Attestation



• The same approach can be applied to attest both parties

Multiple Attestations



- This approach also allows us to bind multiple attestations to the channel
 - By signing the handshake with individual binding keys
- This feature can be useful, if the system has multiple attestable components

Noise

TLS

- Small implementation:
 - 0.9K LOC Noise implementation
 - $\circ \quad \ \ 2.5K \text{ SDK for attestation binding}$
 - Small subset of Rust Crypto
- Doesn't need additional parsers
- Provides patterns that don't require PKI

But:

• Custom solution

- Standard well accepted solution
- Wide variety of features for authentication support

But:

- BoringSSL
 - Threading
 - Standard library for C++ bindings
 - 1.6M LOC
 - but it's not a fair comparison

Conclusion

- Use-case which minimizes the TCB
- Need for a minimalistic crypto protocol
- Use Noise Protocol Framework
- Bind end-to-end encrypted channel to remote attestation

Links

- Project Oak: <u>github.com/project-oak/oak</u>
- Noise Implementation:

github.com/project-oak/oak/tree/main/oak_crypto/src/noise_handshake

• Attestation SDK: github.com/project-oak/oak/tree/main/oak_session

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